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Alexandra ERNST - LPNC - Université Grenoble Alpes 

What distinguishes the imagination of personal future events from imaginary and unrealistic scenarios?

Cognitive and neuroimaging studies have shown that future thinking relies on constructive processes, which flexibly select and combine information stored in memory to create novel event representations. Research has thus far suggested that similar processes are involved in the simulation of personal future event (e.g., your next invited seminar) and purely imaginary scenarios (referred to as scene construction, e.g., lying on a beach in a tropical bay). However, our recent work on cognitive feelings and metacognitive appraisals in future thinking has started to challenge this assumption, by suggesting that future thinking involves more than scene construction. In this talk, I will present recent data on the cognitive ingredients that are necessary to make one believe that an imagined event refers to something that might happen in one’s personal future rather than a mere fantasy.

Kourken Michaelian -PPL - Université Grenoble Alpes 

Confabulation: The philosophical debate

Until recently, philosophers of memory had had relatively little to say about memory errors, contenting themselves with providing merely negative characterizations of confabulation and related errors. A pair of 2016 papers by Robins, however, touched off a lively debate between partisans of positive accounts of confabulation based on rival causal and simulation theories of memory. The talk will provide an overview of this ongoing debate, making a case for the simulationist account and emphasizing open questions pertaining to the role of failures of metacognitive monitoring in confabulation and to the relationship between confabulation and other errors.